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Throughout the history of psychology, most theories of learning have been based 
on the assumption that the person is the passive recipient of knowledge. It has been 
assumed that meaning exists extrinsic to the person, who passively learns about the world. 
Logical Learning Theory (LLT) offers an alternative theory of learning and knowledge. 
In contrast to traditional theories, LLT theorizes that the person actively creates meaning, 
the extension of which is the learning process. Although both theories assume that 
categories, organized patterns of meaning, are essential to knowledge, they disagree on 
whether meaning is created by the person or is passively received by the person. 
Traditionally, the study of children's categories in developmental psychology has 
been based on the assumption that children are passive recipients of knowledge. Logical 
Learning Theory assumes that through the process of predication, children actively engage 
in the creation and extension of meaning. The process of predication involves the 
extension of organized patterns of meaning, or categories, to a target. The sentence "ice 
cream is cold" serves as an example of the predicational process. In the above example, 
the meaning of "cold" is extended to the target or "ice cream." This is an example of how 
meaning is extended and learning occurs. 
According to Logical Learning Theory, oppositionality is fundamental to the 
process of predication. Oppositionality is not something which children learn but is 
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essential to the learning process itself. For example, in order to know that something is 
"cold," one must implicitly understand the meaning of "hot." The meaning of "cold" is 
delimited by the meaning of "hot." Therefore, the child categorizes, or predicates, that 
the ice cream does not belong to the category, or the organized pattern of meaning, of 
"things that are hot." 
The role that oppositionality plays in the development of children's knowledge has 
received little attention in research to date. Unlike LLT, theories that assume that 
meaning exists independent of the person assume that oppositionality is simply another 
meaning which the child must acquire or learn. However, LL T theorizes that 
oppositionality is intrinsic to the predication process itself and therefore "exists" in order 
for children to learn. This thesis explores the ability of kindergartners through fifth 
graders to employ oppositionality in reasoning by administering simple problems to 
determine whether or not they actually know its precise meaning. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Mediational Versus Predicational Theories 
Historically, theories in psychology have been based on a mediational model. A 
mediational model assumes that "something that is produced elsewhere and taken in or 
input comes to play a role in the process that was not initially a part or intrinsic to it" 
(Rychlak, in press). Mediational models of knowledge assume that meaning exists external 
to the individual, who passively receives knowledge. Therefore the content, an ingredient 
employed by the process, plays an important, influential role in mediational theories. The 
content is that which is input, influencing the psychological processes that occur. An 
example would be the hypothesis that the shape of an object determines its categorization. 
In this example the physical shape, or content, which exists external to the person, plays 
an important part in the process of categorization. 
Since objects existing independently of the subject play an important role in the 
psychological process in mediational models, research based on these theories have 
focused on the exact nature of the inputs influencing the process under study. In 
developmental psychology, research on the development of organized patterns of meaning, 
or categories, is based on a mediational model of human thinking. Therefore, research 
in developmental psychology has focused on the attempt to discover the attributes, or 
3 
4 
features, of objects which influence the process of categorization. An example of this is 
the study by Ward and Scott (1987) conducted to discover whether the size or the shape 
of an object is more important in the categorization of the object. The emphasis on the 
features or attributes of the contents of categories has overshadowed discussion of the 
process of categorization within developmental psychology. 
Logical Learning Theory provides an alternative to theories based on the 
mediational model. Unlike theories which employ the mediational model, LLT assumes 
that the person actively creates meaning. Meaning is defined by LLT as "patterned 
intention" (Rychlak, in press). For example, in the statement "Mary stated that she wants 
ice cream," an intention or goal is expressed to obtain ice cream which is logically related 
to the subject, Mary. The ice cream which exists independent of the subject does not 
determine the meaning of the subject's intention to obtain the ice cream. Therefore, within 
LLT meaning is not a reality independent of the person (which is input), but the person 
is the active creator of meaning. 
The difference between Logical Learning Theory and theories based on mediational 
models, is that LL T stresses the fact that the process creates meaning. Process is a 
"discernable, repeatable course of action on the basis of which some item(s) under 
description is/are believed to be sequentially patterned" (Rychlak, in press), whereas 
content is "an ingredient that is produced, conveyed, or otherwise employed by a process" 
(Rychlak, in press). For example in the statement made by the child "ice cream is cold," 
the ideas of "ice cream" and "cold" are the contents, and the process is that which relates 
them. Within mediational models, unlike LLT, the content contains meaning external to 
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the process, and it is this meaning which influences the process itself. For example, a 
mediational model might state that the similarity of the shape of the "ice cream" will 
determine its relationship to "cold" (e.g. whether it is or is not cold). This is an example 
in which external factors, like shape, influence the process. Alternatively, LLT theorizes 
that it is the process of relating the objects which determines the meaning of the objects. 
In other words, it is through the process of "cold" (the predicate) being extended to "ice 
cream" (the target) that "ice cream" has meaning for the child who engages in the process. 
According to LLT, meaning is created, organized, and extended via the process of 
predication. 
LL T -- a Predicational Theory 
Predication is defined by LLT as a process that involves "the logical act of 
affirming, denying, or qualifying precedently broader patterns of meaning in sequacious 
extension to narrower or targeted patterns of meaning. The target is the point, aim, or end 
(telos) of the meaning-extension" (Rychlak, in press). For example, in the predication "ice 
cream is cold," the meaning of "cold" is extended to the target ice cream. In this example, 
the broader pattern of meaning, or category, "cold," is affirmed. Through the extension 
of the meaning of "cold", the ice cream comes to acquire meaning for the person. The 
process of predication also involves qualification. An example of qualification is the 
predication "ice cream is sometimes cold." Again, the meaning of "cold" is extended to 
ice cream, but the extension of this meaning is qualified. 
The process of predication not only involves affirmation and qualification, as has 
been illustrated above, but also denial. Generic oppositionality is intrinsic to the 
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predicational process. Generic oppositionality is "a general aspect of the predicational 
process in which targets fall either under or beyond the meaning being extended by the 
predicate" (Rychlak, in press) For example, the predication "ice cream is white," is 
different from the broader pattern of meaning "cold" which is being extended. 
"Difference obtains when this sameness is negated, thereby removing the target from the 
subsuming meaning without implying any further direction of meaning-extension" 
(Rychlak, in press). For example, in the statement "ice cream is white," the idea of "cold" 
is not extended to "ice cream," which is predicated as being "white." "White" therefore 
would not be included in the broader pattern of meaning, "cold," lying outside of this 
category. Although "white" and "cold" are different, they are not mutually exclusive. Ice 
cream can be both "white" and "cold." Therefore the predication "ice cream is white" 
does not imply or negate the idea of "cold." 
The process of generic oppositionality also includes contents not only different 
from the extended meaning, but also opposite. 
"Delimiting oppositionality: Bounds a specific meaning that 
stands in relation to its bipolar counterpart, as when 'injustice' 
delimits 'justice' and vice versa. Delimiting oppositionality 
involves the contents of the predicational process, enabling the 
reasoner to draw implications. Thus certain opposites lend a 
direction to thought, as when saying 'John is not reliable' implies 
he 'is' unreliable." (Rychlak, in press) 
Unlike contents that are different, contents that are opposite are mutually exclusive. 
Something cannot be both "cold" and "hot." Therefore, contents that are opposite usually 
imply each other. The statement that "the ice cream is white" does not imply anything 
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about the other aspects of the ice cream, like its temperature, whereas the statement "the 
ice cream is cold" would imply that it is "not hot." Contents that are opposite, unlike 
contents that are simply different, delimit each other suggesting a direction of meaning-
extension towards their bipolar counterparts. For example, the statement that "ice cream 
is cold" points the direction in the child's thought towards the idea of "hot" as the 
counterpart of "cold," which is negated by the child's predication. 
According to LL T, generic oppositionality is essential to the process of predication and 
not a by-product which is acquired. In order to know that something is "cold," one must 
have an implicit understanding of what "hot" is. The meaning of "cold" is delimited by 
the meaning of "hot." The process of affirmation and denial of extended meaning are both 
intrinsic to the predication process according to LL T. 
Empirical Support for Lo2ical Learni112 Theory 
Over the years many studies have been conducted by Rychlak and his colleagues 
on the different areas of Logical Learning Theory (LL T). An aspect of LL T that has 
received much attention is affective assessment. Affective assessment is "A transcendental 
telosponse -- an innate capacity to judge (via dialectical division) the meanings of one's 
concepts, premises, and even telosponses, characterizing them as either positive or 
negative in meaningfulness" (Rychlak, 1988 p.509). Since contents, or objects, are 
characterized as either "liked" or "disliked," affective assessment involves delimiting 
oppositionality. The assertion that the affective assessment of words occurs independent 
of the frequency of their association is supported by Abramson, Tasto, and Rychlak 
(1969). Abramson et al. (1969) found that the amount of learned CVC trigrams was 
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correlated with the subject's positive affective assessment and not with the association 
value of the CVC trigrams. The idea that the process of predication, which includes 
affective assessment, is not reducible to word associations and syntax is further supported 
by research on LLT (Rychlak, Stilson, & Rychlak, 1993). Since the process of 
predication occurs independent of the frequency of association of words, affective 
assessment should be operative in young children who have little exposure to word usage. 
Rychlak (1975) found that although affective assessment increased elementary school 
children's memory of designs and abstract paintings for all of the grades studied, first 
graders relied the most heavily on affective assessment. Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj 
(1986) directly studied oppositionality. Rychlak et al. (1986) found that college students 
learned a list of names better when they were described using oppositional features; e.g. 
"Charles is quiet. Douglas is outspoken." than when non-oppositional adjectives were 
used like "quiet, cautious" (Rychlak, 1988). Rychlak and Barnard (1993) also found that 
subjects significantly remembered more words when they were instructed to rate these 
words along an oppositional dimension than when they were instructed to categorize the 
words using non-oppositional descriptors. Slife, Stoneman, and Rychlak (1991) studied 
the effects of the relationship between associated targets and predications. In one of the 
conditions, the associated targets presented to the subject were opposite to the given 
predication. In the other condition, the targets were irrelevant to the given predication. 
For example, if the given predication was "past," then the target in the oppositional 
condition would be "current," and in the irrelevant condition it would be "calm." Slife 
et al. (1991) found that subjects recalled more opposite than irrelevant words. Rychlak, 
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Barnard, Williams, and Wollman (1988) plotted a learning curve which depicted an 
increase in oppositional learning across trials. Although, identical words were. learned 
more rapidly than oppositional words during first exposure, over future exposures (five), 
the difference disappears. This was a rank order and not a statistically significant 
difference. 
Rychlak (in press) found that when given a sentence, subjects chose answers that 
were opposite, demonstrating that an implication toward the opposite occurs. For 
example, the subjects were given sentences like "Karen's face reflected an emotional 
mood, but it was not happiness." A significant number of subjects chose the response, 
"Karen was sad," instead of the response that was simply different, i.e. "Karen was 
bored." 
Theories of Categorization 
Logical Learning Theory can be discussed using the language of categorization. 
The organization of knowledge has been investigated in developmental psychology through 
the study of children's categories. Categories, like predicates, are broader, organized 
patterns of meaning. Therefore, based on LLT, categorization can be described as the 
process of extending meaning from categories, or predicates, to targets. Unlike 
mediational models, on which most theories of categorization are based, LLT theorizes 
that meaning is created through the process of predication and does not exist external to 
the person. Therefore, LLT would not theorize that categories, or broader patterns of 
meaning, exist independent of the process of predication. Within the current literature, 
the ambiguity present between the process of categorization (verb) and categories (noun) 
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results in confusion as to which is the product and which is the producer. However, LL T 
distinguishes between the process of predication (verb) and the resultant predicates (noun). 
"The Greek word Kategorein means 'to predicate'; so in a true 
sense, when we seek categories (classifications, schemata, species, 
and so on) we are attempting to find a wider range of meaning that 
can frame and lend meaning to a targeted item of our interest. " 
(Rychlak, in press) 
Unlike Logical Learning Theory, the current theories of categorization in 
developmental psychology, as will be shown by this author, are based on a mediational 
model. Therefore, the aim of the current research on categorization is to discover the 
amount and types of inputs which are influential to the process of categorization. Since, 
traditionally, the study of organized patterns of meaning in developmental psychology has 
been addressed in terms of categorization, a sampling of these studies will next be 
reviewed. 
Current Theories of Cateiorization 
Kemler-Nelson's theory of analytical and holistic reasoning provides an example 
of a theory based on a mediational model. According to Kemler-Nelson (1984), the 
categorization of an object is determined by the similarity of the attributes of the object. 
Thus, the similarity of attributes directs the process of categorization. Kemler-Nelson 
(1984) states that analytical reasoning occurs when the stimulus is contrasted attribute by 
attribute. Holistic reasoning, according to Kemler-Nelson (1984), involves the 
categorization of the stimuli according to the "overall similarity" of the stimuli. In 
Kemler-Nelson's (1984) study involving kindergartners and fifth graders, she found that 
holistic reasoning develops before analytical reasoning. Ward (1990) refutes Kemler-
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Nelson (1984) by discussing findings from research he and his colleagues conducted which 
found that young children use analytical rather than holistic reasoning. 
Neither analytical nor holistic reasoning as defined by Kemler-Nelson (1984) and 
Ward and Scott (1987) entails an idea of similarity as perceived or conceived by the 
person. Instead, similarity is assumed to be an objective quantitative attribute of the 
relationship between external objects. Even though Kemler-Nelson's (1984) theory of 
analytical and holistic categories presents a new alternative to cluster views of 
categorization as witnessed in the following quote, neither theory presents an alternative 
in which the process of categorization frames or otherwise determines content meanings 
(i.e. categories). 
"Particularly evidence generated by Rosch and her colleagues (cf. 
Mervis & Rosch, 1981) has led psychologists and psycholinguists 
to consider alternatives to the 'classical view' that conceptual 
categories are given by a small set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions that members must meet (E. E. Smith & Medin, 1981). 
The alternative 'cluster view' is that there are a number of 
characteristic attributes which are not necessary and usually not 
sufficient for category membership, but which form a family-
resemblance structure among category members." (Kemler-Nelson, 
1984, pp.774, 775) 
The theories of both "cluster analysis" and holistic and analytical reasoning assume that 
"characteristic attributes" are important influences in the process of categorization. 
The work of Ward, Vela, Perry, Lewis, Bauer, and Flint (1989) provides another 
example of the impact of mediational models on theories of categorization. Ward et al. 
(1989), studying preschoolers and second graders, refute the findings by Kemler-Nelson 
(1984) and other psychologists that holistic reasoning occurs prior to analytical reasoning. 
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Ward and Scott (1987) discuss their hypothesis that both adults and children reason 
analytically and not holistically. Ward and Scott also theorize that children's categories 
are based on the perception of one physical attribute of the stimuli. The research of Ward 
and his colleagues represents an attempt to identify the one physical attribute determining 
young children's categorization of objects. 
One result of this research has been the study of the "shape bias," the hypothesis 
that the shape of an object, rather than its size, is an important determinant in 
categorization. Therefore, according to Ward and Scott (1987), if a child is presented with 
an ice cream cone that matches the shape of one of the exemplars of the given categories, 
the child will place it in that category even if the two items are of vastly different size. 
The "shape bias" is discussed by Ward and Scott as a principle that occurs external to the 
child's thoughts or predications, determining the organization of his or her ideas. The 
work of Ward and his colleagues provides an example of the many studies conducted to 
assess which features of the contents, or objects, to be categorized determine 
categorization. The studies discussed provide an example of the emphasis on the attributes 
or features of the targets of categorization as an important determinant of the process of 
categorization. 
Although Shepp (in Rosch, 1984, chp. 6) theorizes that categories are either 
integral or separable and not analytical or holistic, his research provides another example 
of the search in developmental psychology for the defining characteristics of contents that 
determine categorization. Integral categories, according to Shepp (in Rosch, 1984), are 
categories whose members have dimensions perceived as unitary wholes, whereas the 
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values of separable categories are perceived as distinct. Shepp provides the example of hue 
and brightness as a content that is perceived as integral, and radius and circle as contents 
that are perceived as separable. It is not the process of categorization which determines 
whether a stimulus is perceived as integral or separable, but the structure of the stimulus 
that determines its categorization according to Shepp. The categorization of an object as 
separable or integral is not determined by the person but by the property of the structure 
of the object. This point is further demonstrated by Shepp's (in Rosch, 1984) findings that 
first graders categorize objects as separable which fourth graders categorized as integral 
due to the first graders' lack of selective attention and their inability -- according to Piaget 
-- to decenter. Shepp' s interpretation of the results assumes that the dimensions exist 
externally to the child or "out there," and the child's categories simply map these 
dimensions. Therefore, young children's categories are deficient, since they have an 
inability to perceive existing physical structures which cause categorization. 
Rosch (1984, chp.2) theorizes that not only the correlation of features in the 
external world (e.g. feathers and wings), but also cultural categories determine the 
categories that the person possesses. Within Rosch' s theory, both cultural categories and 
physical correlated features are determinants extrinsic to the person mediating the process 
of categorization. Rosch (1984) differentiates between three types or levels of categories: 
superordinate, basic, and subordinate. Superordinate categories, according to Rosch, are 
categories whose members share only a few features that do not overlap with features 
contained in other categories. Rosch (1984) provides the example of the categories 
"furniture" and "tree" as examples of superordinate categories. "Furniture" meets the 
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criterion for a superordinate category, since there are many types of furniture with varying 
physical attributes not shared by all pieces of furniture. In addition, few of the physical 
attributes of furniture are found in objects categorized as "tree." Superordinate categories, 
according to Rosch (1984), are categories which are most determined by culture. 
One level below superordinate categories, according to Rosch, are basic level 
categories like "chair" or "oak." Rosch states that basic level categories closely mirror 
reality. The other type of categories are subordinate categories, which contain most of the 
features of the object, but these features commonly overlap with features contained in 
other categories. For example, "kitchen chair," and "living room chair" are subordinate 
categories. The type of categorization which occurs, according to Rosch (1984), is driven 
by the principle of cognitive economy. 
Rosch' s typology of categories has led to research designed to determine which 
categories children develop first based on their abilities to perceive and attend to features 
in the external world. An example of this research is the study done by Mandler and 
Bauer (1988) in which the order that 12, 15, and 20-month-old children touched toys was 
recorded. Mandler et al. (1988) hypothesized that children touch toys repeatably in the 
order which corresponds to their categories. They conclude that children form 
superordinate categories from basic level categories at an early age. Since, according to 
Rosch (1984), basic level categories mirror reality, these categories would involve little 
cognitive processing on the child's part and should therefore develop first. According to 
Rosch, the other levels of categories are also mediated by objects independent of the child. 
However, the integration of the features of these objects involves more cognitive 
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processing, since subordinate categories contain features that overlap with other 
categories, and subordinate categories are the most distinctive categories requiring the 
greatest perceptual awareness. 
Rosch (1984) elaborates on the current idea of similarity as determined by the 
correlation of shared physical features to develop the idea of prototypicality. A prototype 
is the most representative member of a category. Rosch (1984) refers to the prototype as 
the mean or mode of the attributes of a category. For example, Rosch (1984) found that 
in categories determined by size, the prototype was the mean of the sizes of the category 
members. In addition to being the mode or mean of the attributes of the category, 
prototypes have the fewest features in common with other categories. This formulation 
shows the extent to which categories within Rosch' s theory are defined and determined by 
attributes. Rosch, unlike other theorists, does not believe that the attributes which 
determine categorization are always physical attributes. Sometimes, according to Rosch, 
these attributes are contextual; however, the context exists external to the person 
influencing the process of categorization and is never subjective. The extent to which 
attributes determine categorization, according to Rosch, is related to the frequency with 
which they are encountered. The categorization of an object is determined by the nearness 
of its features to the prototype of one category and the amount its features overlap with the 
features of other categories. 
All of the above theorists discuss similarity in terms of the similarity between 
contents which determine categorization. When two objects have similar attributes or 
features, they are categorized together. Since it is the contents, or objects themselves, that 
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determine how they are categorized, the notion of difference has little relevancy to 
mediational theories. Difference is simply defined by current theories of categorization 
as features that are not similar. Difference is not an important idea in mediational 
theories, since the person does not conceive of the objects as similar and thus does not 
need to know that the objects could be dissimilar. The insignificance of the notion of 
difference is illustrated by Rosch's quote. 
"As Wittgenstein (1953) pointed out, categorical judgements 
become a problem only if one is concerned with boundaries -- in the 
normal course of life, two neighbors know on whose property they 
are standing without exact demarcation of the boundary line. 
Categories can be viewed in terms of their clear cases if the 
perceiver places emphasis on the correlational structure of perceived 
attributes such that the categories are represented by their most 
structured portions." (Rosch, 1984, p.36) 
The idea of difference is important if the process is not determined by external 
objects but by the person. If this is actuality the case, then the person must be able to 
judge the category to which the object belongs. Unlike the above theories, the process of 
generic oppositionality, intrinsic to the predicational process, is an important part of LL T. 
As has been shown, LL T is not just another theory of categorization, but rather a theory 
in which the process of predication creates meaning. If meaning exists external to the 
person, then the person is nothing more than the passive recipient of knowledge. The 
knowledge which the person possesses, according to mediational models of theorizing, is 
simply a matching mirror of reality. Oppositionality is not, according to LL T, something 
that is acquired as a result of external inputs. Generic oppositionality is a process without 
which meaning would not exist and learning could not occur. 
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The Present Study 
The goal of the present study is to explore children's use and understanding of 
oppositionality. As has been shown, oppositionality is an area of study which has received 
little attention in the developmental literature. The research which has directly studied 
oppositionality has focused on the learning or memorizing of words that are opposite. For 
example, Kreutzer, Flavell, and Leonard (1975) found that as children grow older they 
find oppositionality to be a beneficial heuristic device in the memorization of words. In 
a study done by Kreutzer et al. (1975), it was found that when presented with the choice 
of memorizing a list of words that were arbitrary ("Mary-walks") or a list of oppositional 
words ("girl-boy"), kindergartners showed no preference and the first graders were split 
as to which list they would prefer to learn. However, the rest of the grades, second 
through fifth, overwhelmingly preferred to learn a list of opposite words. This research 
supports the idea that as children grow older their recognition of oppositional words, as 
distinct from words that are simply different, increases. In other words, the use of 
delimiting oppositionality increases with age. This is not surprising, since delimiting 
oppositionality involves the contents of the process of generic oppositionality, and these 
contents are often learned as children grow older. 
The research proposed in this thesis is aimed at studying the development of 
oppositionality independent of the learning of syntax. This goal finds support in the 
research done by Levine and Carey (1982). Levine and Carey (1982) studied two and 
three year old children's syntactical usage and semantical understanding of "front" and 
"back." They found that children understand "front" and "back" through their 
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performance of tasks involving lining up stuffed animals for a parade. They found that 
this understanding occurred before the children learned the words "front" and. "back." 
Based on this research, the current study proposes to explore children's spontaneous usage 
of opposites and the recognition and understanding of oppositionality of kindergartners 
through fifth graders. 
Hypotheses and Rationale 
Hypotheses. 
Hypothesis I: Children will use words that are opposite across the 
ages studied (kindergarten through fifth grade). This will occur 
even though children do not know the meaning of the word 
"opposite." 
Hypothesis II: The use of oppositional words and the ability to 
recognize and detect opposites will increase with grade level. 
Hypothesis III: Developmental improvement will be seen in the 
recognition and detection of opposites over the grade levels, but at 
a less pronounced rate than the use of oppositional words. 
Rationale. 
According to Logical Learning Theory, the predicational process is innate. 
Therefore, children from birth onward are categorizing objects through the process of 
predication (Rychlak, in press). Intrinsic to predication is the process of generic 
oppositionality. Since generic oppositionality is an intrinsic part of the predicational 
process, it should be evidenced in all children, including children who do not know the 
meaning of the word "opposite." Therefore, children at all of the studied grade levels 
should be able to provide words that are opposite. Children who do not know the meaning 
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of the word "opposite" should not do as well on tasks that include the word "opposite" in 
the instructions i.e., "Are the two words opposite?" and "Pick out the two sentences that 
are opposite. " 
Hypothesis II and Hypothesis III focus on the developmental changes that occur in 
children's use of oppositionality. According to LLT, the contents of the categories change 
with age as a result of exposure, but the process itself does not develop (Rychlak, in 
press). Therefore, with the expansion of language, children will be able to recognize and 
detect opposites, which according to Hypothesis I, they were using before they possessed 
a knowledge of oppositionality. Since delimiting oppositionality involves word contents 
(e.g. "hot-cold") that are opposite, with an increase in vocabulary, children will know 
more opposite meanings to these vocabulary items. The most difficult aspect of 
oppositionality for children should therefore be the recognition and detection of opposites. 
It is predicted that children will have low scores on the task that requires the recognition 
of opposites, since this entails the knowledge that words belong to the linguistic category 
labeled "opposites. " 
The reason that it should be difficult for children to differentiate between sentences 
that are opposite and sentences that are different is that both different and opposite are 
aspects of the same process -- generic oppositionality. Targets that are different and 
targets that are opposite both lie outside of the realm of meaning being extended. 
However, oppositionality also involves a relationship between contents which are mutually 
exclusive, suggesting a direction of meaning-extension towards their bipolar counterpart. 
To know that the words "hot" and "cold" are opposite, and not simply different, one has 
20 
to understand the relationship between the words "hot" and "cold." The child must also 
understand the difference between contents that are opposite and contents that are simply 
different. Contents that are opposite are different from the meaning being extended and 
possess a more involved relationship than contents that are merely different. To be able 





The participants were 127 children, 60 males and 66 females, grades first through 
fifth from four different Chicago parochial schools varying from high to low SES. There 
were 19 kindergartners (10 males, 9 females), 27 first graders (10 males, 17 females), 21 
second graders (8 males, 13 females), 24 third graders (15 males, 9 females), 17 fourth 
graders (9 males, 8 females) and 19 fifth graders (9 males, 10 females). Two 
kindergartners were dropped from the study because one did not speak any English and 
the other did not want to complete the session. 
Independent and Dependent Variable 
The independent variable was a questionnaire which consisted of four subsections, 
each designed to test a different aspect of oppositionality; i.e., use of opposite words, 
understanding of the meaning of the word "opposite," recognition of words that are 
opposite, and ability to identify opposite sentences (see appendix A). The dependent 
variable was the children's answers to the questionnaire. The scoring of the questionnaire 
will be discussed in terms of each subsection. (See Appendix D for the actual scores). 
Subsection I. The first section was designed to test whether children provided 
answers which were opposite prior to any discussion of oppositionality. It was comprised 
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of fifteen questions. (See appendix A for exact questions). All of the questions were 
written in the format: "if X isn't doing Y, what is X doing?" For example, "If Mary isn't 
going into the house, where is she going?" 
Scoring of subsection I. The children were scored as either providing an opposite 
or non-opposite answer. An example of an opposite answer to the question "If Mary isn't 
going into the house, where is Mary going?" would be "She is going outside." Answers 
that did not incorporate the idea of going outside were scored as non-opposite. A common 
answer that was scored as non-opposite was "She is going to the store." The possible 
range of scores was 0-15. 
Subsection II. The purpose of this section was to discover whether children knew 
the meaning of the word "opposite." In this section the children were directly asked if 
they could define and provide an example of something that was opposite. The children 
were also asked "Is opposite the same as different?" Then they were asked to "give an 
example of two things that are different but not opposite." Children who could not 
provide an example of two things that are opposite were given several examples of 
opposites (e.g. "hot-cold"). The children were then given two words that were different 
but not opposite in order to test if they fully understood the concept. 
Scoring of subsection II. Children were scored as "knowing opposites" if they 
could either define opposite or provide an example. A child would, therefore, be scored 
as "knowing opposites" if he or she provided the example "hot-cold." However, if 
children provided an example of two things that are different, "green-red," they were not 
considered as understanding oppositionality. The children's definition of opposite as 
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"things that are different" did not qualify as a definition of opposite. The scores were used 
to divide the children into two categories: those who did not the meaning of the word 
"opposite," and those who did know the meaning of the word "opposite." 
In order to establish interrater reliability in the decision as to whether either the 
subject's definition or example of opposite was appropriate, 101 subjects were randomly 
selected across the grade levels tested, and two raters made the judgement as to the 
"appropriateness" or "inappropriateness" of the definitions and examples rendered. The 
ratings were completely independent. A percent-agreement score was then determined by 
dividing the agreements between the two raters by their agreements plus disagreements 
(i.e., the total judgments made). It was found that there was a 95% agreement between 
the two raters. 
Subsection III. The purpose of this section was to test whether children provided 
and recognized answers that are opposite. The recognition of words as opposite involves 
the children's understanding of oppositionality. This section involved two parts: (1) the 
children's responding with a word which is opposite and (2) the recognition of the word 
as opposite. After having discussed in the previous section the concept of oppositionality, 
the children were given eleven sentences to finish. For example, "If Jack is not fat, he is 
" The child was then asked if fat and the answer she or he provided were opposite. 
Scorin2 of subsection III. There were two scores for subsection III: subsection 
Illa and subsection Illb. Subsection ma is comprised of a score representing the number 
of opposite responses the children provided. Each response was scored as either opposite 
or not opposite. The possible range was 0-11. 
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Subsection IIIb assessed the children's ability to recognize words as opposite. A 
child was scored as recognizing a word as opposite if ( 1) the child provided an 
oppositional word (scored in subsection Illa) and (2) said that the word was opposite. The 
possible range was 0-11. 
The scores on subsection Illa and subsection Illb are not independent, since a child 
must receive a score on subsection Illa (provide an opposite word) in order to receive a 
score on subsection Illb (recognize that the word provided is opposite from the given 
word). 
Subsection IV. The final section of the questionnaire was designed to test the 
children's ability to identify a pair of sentences that are opposite. In the final section of 
the questionnaire the children were given eleven sets of four sentences. Each of the sets 
of sentences contained a pair that was opposite and a pair that was different. The child 
was instructed to pick out the two sentences that were opposite. For example, one set of 
sentences was: (1) "Mary's room was messy." (2) "Jane's room was clean." (3) "Linda's 
room was large." and (4) "Beth's room was dirty." The purpose of this section was to test 
the children's ability to identify a pair of sentences that is opposite from among a set of 
sentences containing pairs of sentences that are same or different. 
Unlike in section III, children in section IV had to choose a whole sentence that is 
opposite and could not simply rely on knowing words that are opposite. This is the case 
since in some of the questions, two sentences contained the same opposite word. For 
example, the child must choose whether "Laura ate a hot lunch." or "Linda ate a hot 
sandwich" is opposite of "Mary ate a cQld sandwich." (emphasis added). 
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Scoring of subsection IV. In subsection IV the children were scored as having 
identified opposites if they chose two of the given sentences which were opposite. They 
were scored as not identifying opposites if they picked two sentences which were not 
opposite. The possible range was 0-11. 
Procedure 
Each child was individually tested. The children were tested in a location set aside 
for the experiment. Before the questionnaire was administered, time was spent with the 
child making him or her feel at ease in the testing situation. The added time helped 
children overcome their shyness. The experimenter also spent time interacting with the 
students and faculty at each of the different schools so that the children did not perceive 
her as a stranger. 
The subsections of the questionnaire were administered in the same order to all 
subjects, although the questions within each subsection were administered in a random 
order. For subsection IV the sentences were printed on individual pieces of paper which 
the children could handle. Each sentence was pointed to as it was repeatably read to the 
child. After the child had selected the two sentences in subsection IV the sentences were 
read to the child to make sure that these were the sentences the child had meant to select. 
This procedure was followed so as not to discriminate against children who could not read. 
Results 
The dependent measure was the number of correct answers provided by the child 
for each subsection of the questionnaire. The exact scoring of each subsection is presented 
above. (See Appendix B for the raw scores). 
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The number of correct answers for each subsection was summed for each child. 
For example, a child might have received a score of 8 on subsection I (providing opposite 
words), 9 on subsection Illa (providing opposite words), 7 on subsection Illb (recognizing 
opposite words), and 7 on subsection IV (selecting two sentences that are opposite). Since 
the scores were summed for each subsection for each individual, the above score of 7 on 
subsection IV would mean that the child picked 7 sentences reflecting opposition out of 
a set of 11 sentences in which both opposite, same, and different sentences were provided. 
The child would also be categorized based on subsection II ( defining opposite) as either 
knowing or not knowing the word "opposite." Each hypothesis was individually tested. 
Hypothesis I. The first hypothesis predicted that children who did not know the 
meaning of the word "opposite" would still use oppositional words. Children were scored 
as not knowing what the word "opposite" meant if in subsection II they could not define 
or provide an example of something that is "opposite." Only 6 (of 127) subjects (2 fifth 
graders, 2 fourth graders, and 2 third graders) could define "opposite." Five of the 6 
subjects defined opposite as "exact different of something else," and one subject (3rd 
grade) defined it as "the reverse of something." Both of these are definitions of delimiting 
oppositionality, since they suggest a direction towards the bipolar counterpart of the target. 
The other 121 subjects either could not define the word "opposite" or provided the 
definition "something different from something. " Since this definition does not directly 
address oppositionality, it was not considered acceptable. 
Most subjects could provide an example of something that was opposite. The two 
most frequent examples given were "up-down" and "stop-go." Examples of objects that 
27 
were different but not opposite (e.g., green-red) were not counted. A majority of the 25 
(of 127) subjects who did not know what the word "opposite" meant provided examples 
of two objects that were different. Out of the 25 subjects who were scored as not knowing 
the word "opposite" there were 10 kindergartners (n= 19), 7 first graders (n=27), 2 
second graders (n=21), 3 third graders (n=24), 2 fourth graders (n= 17), and 1 fifth 
grader (n= 19). As discussed above in the discussion of subsection II, the interrater 
reliability check, which was conducted using a percent agreement score for 101 subjects, 
was 95%. 
In order to test hypothesis I, which predicted that children who do not know the 
word "opposite" will use oppositional words, the performance of the subjects who did not 
know what the word "opposite" meant were tested against the performance of the 102 
subjects who knew what the word "opposite" meant. A Chi-Square (Hays, 1988, pp. 775-
779) was run on subsection I (provide words that are opposite) and subsection II 
(knowledge of the word "opposite"). (See table 1 below). The subjects were categorized 
as either "using many opposite words" or "not using many opposite words" based on the 
median of the arrayed scores. The Chi-Square test yielded a value of X2 = 8.68, df = 1, 
12 < .01. (See table 1 below). 
TABLE 1 
FREQUENCY OF USE OF OPPOSITIONAL WORDS 

















In order to check the reliability, a Chi-Square was also run on subsection Illa 
(provide words that are opposite) and subsection II (knowledge of the word "opposite"). 
Subjects were categorized as "using many opposite words" based on a median split of the 
arrayed scores. The analysis resulted in a X2 = 20.82, df = 1, p < .01. (See table 2 
below). 
TABLE2 
FREQUENCY OF USE OF OPPOSITIONAL WORDS 

















Since 17 of the 25 subjects who did not know the word "opposite" were in 
kindergarten and first grade, a Chi-Square was conducted to test whether the performance 
of kindergartners and first graders who did know the word "opposite" differed from that 
of kindergartners and first graders who did not know the word "opposite." A test was 
conducted only on kindergartners and first graders to control for a possible effect for 
improvement in performance due to increase in grade level. A median split of the arrayed 
scores was used to categorize the children as either "using" or "not using" many opposite 
words. An analysis of subsection I (provide words that are opposite) and subsection II 
(define opposite) yielded a X2 = 2.32, df = 1, n.s. (See table 3). 
TABLE 3 
FREQUENCY OF USE OF OPPOSITIONAL WORDS 

















A Chi-Square was also run on subsection ma (provide words that are opposite) for 
kindergarten and first grade. The analysis yielded a X2 = 5.68 df = 1, 12 < .05 (See 
table 4 below). 
TABLE4 
FREQUENCY OF USE OF OPPOSITIONAL WORDS 

















The result showed that there was a significant difference between the amount of 
opposite words used by children who were categorized as "knowing opposite" and children 
who were categorized as not "not knowing opposite." There was not a significant 
difference between the performance of kindergartners and first graders who did and did 
not know the word "opposite" for subsection I. For subsection Illa, which was conducted 
after the experimenter had discussed the meaning of "opposite" with the children, there 
was a significant difference in performance between the two groups of children. 
Although children who knew what the word "opposite" means used significantly 
more opposite words than the children who did not know what the word "opposite" means, 
the latter still provided words that were opposite. The mean number of opposite words 
for subsection I provided by the 25 subjects who did not know what the word "opposite" 
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means is 9.24 with a standard deviation of 3.41. The least amount of opposite words 
provided was 2 given by one kindergartner and 4 given by two kindergartners. The rest 
of the 25 subjects provided 7 or more opposite words for subsection I. For subsection 
Illa, the mean number of opposite words provided by the 25 subjects, who were 
categorized as not knowing "opposite" is 8.59 with a standard deviation of 2.18. The 
subjects who did not know the meaning of the word "opposite" used less words that are 
opposite than subjects who knew the meaning of the word. However, the former subjects 
still provided words that are opposite. 
Hypothesis II. Hypothesis II predicted that children's use of opposites and 
ability to recognize and identify opposites would increase with grade level. The means 
and standard deviations for the raw scores for the different subsections at the different 
grade levels are presented below in table 5. 
TABLES 
CELL MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
FOR THE RAW SCORES 
Subsections 
Grade I IIIA 
K 7.68 7.89 
(3.20) (2.45) 
1 10.30 9.52 
(1.92) (1.40) 
2 11.81 10.62 
(1.60) (0.67) 
3 12.67 10.58 
(1.74) (0.58) 
4 12.24 10.65 
(2.08) (0.61) 
5 13.37 10.89 
(1.12) (0.32) 
Marginal 11.34 10.02 
X (2.07) (1.15) 
Standard deviations in parenthesis 
Possible Ranges 
Subsection I = 1 - 15 
Subsection Illa = 1 - 11 
Subsection lllb = 1 - 11 
































In order to test hypothesis II, which predicted that children's ability to use, 
recognize and identify opposites would improve with grade level, each subsection was 
individually tested. Three One-Way ANOVAs (Collyer & Enns, 1993, chp. 2) were 
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conducted using subsection I (providing opposite words), subsection Illb (recognizing 
opposite words), and subsection IV (selecting two sentences that are opposite). These 
subsections were used because they tested the use, recognition, and identification of 
opposites. Subsection Illa was not used, since it is not independent of subsection Illb. In 
order to receive a score on subsection Illb (recognize a word as opposite), the subject must 
receive a score on subsection ma (provide a word that is opposite). The scores for all of 
the subjects were used, both those who were categorized as knowing and not knowing the 
word "opposite." 
In order to test the hypothesis that grade level (independent variable) influenced 
performance on subsection I, subsection Illb, and subsection IV (dependent variable), three 
One-Way ANOVAs were conducted. The first One-Way ANOVA tested whether grade 
level had an effect on performance on subsection I (provide words that are opposite). The 
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(Collyer & Enns, 1987, p. 56) 
.001 
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In order to identify where the differences occurred, a post hoc analysis was 
conducted on the means for each grade on subsection I using the within error term from 
the above ANOV A. A Tukey HSD revealed that there was a significant difference 
between kindergarten and each of the other grades, and between first, third, fourth and 
fifth grade. There were no significant differences for the other grade levels. (See table 7 
below). 
TABLE 7 
TUKEY HSD FOR THE MEANS AT GRADE LEVELS 








* = p < .05 















In order to test the prediction that the recognition of opposites would improve with 
grade level, subsection IIIb (recognition of opposite words) was used. A One-Way 
ANOVA was conducted. The effect for grade level was E = 17.06, df = 5, 121, p < 
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(Collyer & Enns, 1987, p. 56) 
In order to identify where the differences occurred, 
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.001 
a post hoc analysis was conducted on the means for the grade levels on subsection Illb 
using the within error term from the above ANOV A. A Tukey HSD revealed that there 
was a significant difference between kindergarten and each of the other grades and 
between first grade and each of the other grades. There were no significant differences 








* = p < .05 
TABLE9 
TUKEY HSD FOR MEANS AT GRADE LEVELS 


















In order to test the prediction that there would be an improvement in the ability to 
identify opposites with an increase in grade level, subsection IV (ability to choose two 
sentences that are opposite) was used. A One-Way ANOVA was conducted. The effect 
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(Collyer & Enns, 1987, p. 56) 
In order to identify where the differences occurred, 
38 
.001 
a post hoc analysis was conducted on the means of the grade levels for subsection IV using 
the within error term from the above ANOV A. A Tukey HSD revealed that there was a 
significant difference between kindergarten and each of the other grades and between first 
grade and each of the other grades. There were no significant differences for the other 








* = p < .05 
TABLE 11 
TUKEY HSD FOR MEANS AT GRADE LEVELS 


















The results support the hypothesis that children's use, recognition, and 
identification of opposites increases with grade level. The post hoc analysis revealed that 
the performance for kindergartners on each subsection tested, subsection I (use of opposite 
words), subsection IIlb (recognition of opposite words), and subsection IV (identification 
of opposite sentences) was significantly different than the performance of the other grade 
levels. For subsection I (use of opposites), there was no significant difference between the 
performance for first and second grade; whereas for subsection IIIb (recognition of 
opposite words) and subsection IV (identification of opposite sentences), there were 
significant differences between first grade and each of the other grades. 
Hypothesis III. Hypothesis III predicted that developmental improvements would 
be seen in the recognition and identification of opposites over the grade levels but at a less 
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pronounced rate than the development of the use of oppositional words. Whereas 
hypothesis II predicted that an improvement in performance would occur with 
development, hypothesis III specifies that improvement would be more pronounced for the 
use of oppositional words than for the recognition and identification of opposites. In 
hypothesis III, unlike in hypothesis II, the emphasis is on the difference in the performance 
on the different subsections. Therefore, in order to test hypothesis III, a mixed model 
ANOVA (Collyer, & Enns, 1993, chp. 8) was used so that comparisons could be made 
across the subsections. 
First, the scores were changed into standard z scores (Hays, 1988, p.180). The 
purpose of transforming the data into z scores was to create a common scale to allow for 
the possibility of making comparisons across the subsections in order to test for an 
interaction. This was necessary since the possible range for subsection I is 0-15 and the 
possible range for subsection Illb and IV is 1-11. Furthermore, no assumption could be 
made that these score units are identical. In order to test hypothesis II, a mixed model 
ANOVA was conducted using subsection I (providing opposite words), subsection Illb 
(recognizing opposite words), and subsection IV (selecting a pair of sentences that are 
opposite). These subsections were used because they tested the use, recognition, and 
identification of opposites. Subsection Illa was not used since, as discussed above, it is 
not independent of subsection Illb. The scores for all of the subjects were used, both 
those who were categorized as knowing and as not knowing the meaning of the word 
"opposite. " 
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In order to test the hypothesis that the development of the use of oppositional words 
would occur at a less pronounced rate than the development of the recognition and 
identification of opposites a 6 (grade level) X 3 (subsections I, Illb, IV) factorial ANOVA 
was run on these data. The former were between subjects and the later were within 
subjects (Collyer, & Enns, 1993, chp. 8). The effects for grade level was E = 35.08 df 
= 5, 121, 12 < . 001 . There was not a significant effect for subsections; E = . 01, df = 
2, 242, n.s. A significant interaction did not occur for grade X subsection, E = 3.26, df 
= 10, 242, n....s... (See table 12 below). 
TABLE 12 
SUMMARY OF 6 X 3 ANOV A 
PERFORMANCE ON SUBSECTIONS 
Source df MS E 12 
Grade level 5 33.86 35.08 .001 
Error 121 0.94 
Subsections 2 0.10 0.03 .973 
Interaction 10 0.33 0.88 .554 
Error 242 0.37 
(Collyer & Enns, 1987, p. 196) 
In order to identify where the significant differences for grade level occurred, a 
post hoc analysis was conducted using the means for the standardized scores (so that 
comparisons could be made across subsections), and the error term from the above 
ANOV A. (See table 13 below). 
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A Tukey HSD revealed that there was a significant difference between the 
performance of kindergartners and each of the other grades, and there was a significant 
difference between the performance of first graders and each of the other grades. No 
significant differences were found at the other grade levels. (See table 10 below). 
TABLE 13 
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A further exploration of the data was conducted in order to assess if there were any 
differences for the different subsections. This was necessary since through the 
performance of the z transformation the means for the different subsections were set at 
zero, hiding any real differences which might exist. A Chi-Square goodness of fit test was 
run to assess whether the ability to recognize words that are opposite (subsection lllb) and 
the ability to identify sentences that are opposite (subsection IV) develops at the same rate. 
Each grade was analyzed separately to avoid ceiling effects. 
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In order to study the development of the recognition of oppositionality, a frequency 
matrix of children who were categorized as either being able or not being able to recognize 
and identify opposites was created for each grade studied. Children had to recognize more 
than half of the words within each subsection in order to be categorized as "recognizing 
opposites. " For subsection Illb (possible range = 0-11) children had to recognize 6 or 
more words in order to be categorized as "recognizing opposites." For subsection IV 
(possible range = 0-11) the children had to identify 6 or more of the opposite sentences 
in order to be categorized as "identifying opposites." A Chi-Square goodness of fit test 
(Hays, 1988, pp. 775-778) was run on the frequency matrices for each grade level: 
number of kindergartners = 19, first graders= 27, second graders= 21, third graders 
= 24, fourth graders = 17, and fifth graders = 19. (See table 14 below.) 
A Chi-Square goodness of fit test conducted on the frequency matrices at each 
grade yielded the following results: kindergarten, X2(1) = 0.16, n.s., first grade X2(1) 
= 13.74, p < .001, second grade X2(1) = 52.40, p < .001, third grade X2(1) = 64.33, 
p < .001, fourth grade, X2(1) = 51, p < .001, fifth grade X2(1) = 57, p < .001. 
TABLE14 
FREQUENCY OF RECOGNITION AND IDENTIFICATION OF OPPOSITES 










































































































Although there was a significant effect for grade level, there was no significant 
effect for subsection, nor was there a significant interaction. The frequency matrices 
revealed that an increase in performance occurred at the same rate across the subsections 
studied. The frequency matrices (see table 11 above) indicate that the ability to recognize 
and identify opposites occurred as early as second grade. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The results showed that children who do not know the meaning of the word 
"opposite" used significantly fewer opposite words than children who know the meaning 
of the word "opposite." For kindergarten and first grade the results showed that on 
subsection I, which was administered prior to a discussion about the meaning of the word 
opposite, there was no significant differences between the number of opposite words 
provided by children categorized as "not knowing the meaning of the word opposite" 
versus the number provided by children categorized as "knowing the meaning of the word 
opposite." However, for subsection Illa there was a significant difference between the 
number of words that the two groups of children provided. The number of children 
categorized as "knowing the meaning of the word opposite" who provided words that are 
opposite increased after discussing the meaning of the word opposite with the 
experimenter. However, the children categorized as "not knowing the meaning of the 
word opposite" provided fewer opposite words in subsection Illa after a discussion of the 
meaning of opposite occurred. This would suggest that the children did not acquire an 
understanding of oppositionality during their discussion with the experimenter. It appears 
that children who did not know the meaning of the word "opposite" did not learn it during 
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the course of this experiment. This supports the idea that children use "opposite" words 
before they know the meaning of the word "opposite. " 
The idea that children use opposite words before they know what "opposite" means 
is further supported by the fact that all of the children who did not know the meaning of 
the word "opposite" used words that are opposite. In addition, the mean score of the 25 
subjects who did not know the word "opposite" for the number of opposite words used for 
both subsection I and subsection Illb was greater than the midpoint of the scale. 
It can also be concluded based on the results of this experiment that children's use, 
recognition, and identification of opposites increases with grade level. Each of the three 
One-Way ANOVAs, which tested different subsections, revealed a significant difference 
between the performance of the different grades. Post hoc analyses showed that for the 
use of opposite words (subsection I), the recognition of opposite words (subsection Illb), 
and the identification of sentences that are opposite (subsection IV) the performance of 
kindergartners was significantly different than the performance of each of the other grades 
studied. The post hoc analysis for the use of opposite words (subsection I) revealed that 
there was also a significant difference between the performance of first graders and third, 
fourth, and fifth graders. There was a significant difference for the recognition of opposite 
words (subsection Illb), and identification of opposite sentences (subsection IV) between 
first graders and second, fourth and fifth graders. There were no significant differences 
found between the performance of the other grade levels. The assertion by Logical 
Learning Theory that generic oppositionality is not learned, but is that through which the 
contents of delimiting oppositionality are learned, is supported by the improvement in 
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performance that occurred with increase in grade level. Since delimiting oppositionality 
involves the predication of contents as opposite, then improvement in delimiting 
oppositionality should be seen as children become older and are exposed to more 
information. 
The assertion by Logical Learning Theory that generic oppositionality is innate and 
not learned is supported by the findings. The fact that children use oppositional words 
before they know the meaning of the word "opposite" supports the theory that generic 
oppositionality is a process that is not determined by the content which is input (i.e., a 
learned vocabulary). This is further supported by the fact that children's performance on 
the recognition of opposites was not stronger in the task which required only the 
recognition of words (as revealed by the significant Chi-Squares obtained at the different 
grade levels for subsection Illb and IV). If children learn that certain words are opposite, 
then they should have experienced the most difficulty in subsection IV (ability to choose 
two sentences that are opposite). This subsection should have been more difficult, since 
children could not choose the sentences which are opposite by recognizing words that are 
opposite. This was prevented by using sentences that shared the same opposite word. For 
example, the child must choose whether "Laura ate a hQ1 lunch" or "Linda ate a hot 
sandwich" is opposite of "Mary ate a cold sandwich" (emphasis added). This assertion 
can be further tested by conducting research utilizing more sentences which share the same 
words. 
The goal of this study was to discover if children used opposites, could recognize 
words that are opposite, and identify a word as "opposite." Not only was support found 
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for the hypothesis that children use opposites, but it was also found that children as young 
as kindergartners were engaged in oppositional reasoning. However, did the .children 
really understand oppositionality? The question remains whether children can differentiate 
between contents that are opposite and contents that are different but not opposite. 
According to LLT, intrinsic to predication is generic oppositionality, which involves the 
predication of a target as either different or opposite from the targeted category or 
predication. Unlike targets that are different, targets that are opposite delimit the meaning 
of the predication and suggest a direction for predication or categorization (Rychlak, in 
press). Through elaboration of subsection IV, involving the relationship between 
sentences, it would be possible to study children's understanding of the relationships of 
same, different, and opposite. 
The present study suggests that, when given an exemplar, children can provide an 
opposite example and recognize it as opposite. Therefore, it is theorized that children 
categorize objects based on a predicational and not a mediational model. It is therefore 
theorized that, in the studies of categorization, the similarity of the attributes of the targets, 
or objects, did not cause the categorization of the targets; rather, the child categorized the 
target by the process of predication involving generic oppositionality. The child may have 
predicated that the attributes which matched one category and not the other were 
important. 
The recommended research which has been discussed involves simple follow-ups 
to the present study. However, oppositionality is an important process in which children 
engage. Since children use oppositional reasoning, then this must influence how children 
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make judgments about the world. Research can also be conducted studying the moral 
development of children in terms of the learning of oppositionality. For example, a child 
who is told that "it is good to tell the truth," should reason that "lying is bad." I have only 
been able to present a sample of the research that can be conducted based on the findings 
that young children engage in oppositional reasoning. I believe that if more developmental 
psychologists accepted the idea that children reason oppositionally, then, as developmental 






1) If John isn't happy what is he? 
2) If Mary isn't going into the house, where is she going? 
3) If Linda isn't a slow runner, what is she? 
4) If Jane is not going up stairs, where is she going? 
5) If Karen doesn't like school, how does she feel about it? 
6) If Janet doesn't think that the picture is pretty, what does she think about it? 
7) If Bobby isn't tall, what is he? 
8) If Mary did not play her stereo loud, how did she play it? 
9) If Kathy isn't sick, what is she? 
10) If Marie did not wake up, what did she do? 
11) If Kevin doesn't like hot food, what does he like? 
12) If Luke did not say no, what did he say? 
13) If Kate did not win, what did she do? 
14) If Dave did not open the door, what did he do? 
15) If Linda is not first in line, what is she? 
Subsection II 
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1) Do you know what the word opposite means? Can you define the word opposite for 
me? 
2) Can you give me an example of two things which are opposite? 
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3) Is opposite the same as different? 
4) Can you give me an example of two things that are different but not opposite? 
If the child doesn't know what opposite means tell the child: Some examples of things 
which are opposite are 
heavy and light 
open and shut 
hot and cold 
fat and thin 
fat and thin are opposite but fat and short are not opposite. Not everything which is 
different is opposite. 
5) Are cold and wet opposite? 
6) Are cold and wet different? 
Subsection III 
1) If Linda is not young, what is she __ 
a) Is young and _ opposite? 
2) If Jack is not fat, he is __ 
a) Is fat and __ opposite? 
3) If Mary did not got to sleep, she ___ _ 
a) Is going to sleep and _ opposite? 
4) If John was not quiet, he was __ _ 
a) Is quiet and _ opposite? 
5) If the light is not on, it is __ 
a) Is on and __ opposite? 
6) If sand is not wet, it is _ 
a) Is wet and _ opposite? 
7) If it is not warm, it is ___ _ 
a) Is warm and_ opposite? 
8) If it is not day, it is __ _ 
a) Is day and _ opposite? 
9) If the work is not easy, it is __ _ 
a) Is easy and_ opposite? 
10) If Jane didn't tell a lie, she told the __ _ 
a) Is telling the truth and __ opposite? 
11) If Mary didn't win the game, she __ 
a) Is winning and __ opposite? 
Subsection IV 
1) Mary's room was messy. 
Jane's room was clean. 
Linda's room was large. 
Beth's room was dirty. 
a) Which two are opposite? 
2) Jack woke up. 
Mark got out of bed. 
Scot ate lunch. 
Kevin went to sleep. 
a) Which two are opposite? 
3) Marie ran quickly. 
Laura skipped. 
Jane ran slowly. 
Betty ran fast. 
a) Which two are opposite? 
4) Kathy hated the picture. 
Linda liked the picture. 
Beth disliked the picture. 
Jan drew the picture. 
a) Which are opposite? 
5) Laura went inside. 
Shelly went outside. 
Nancy went upstairs. 
Maggie went to the store. 
a) Which two are opposite? 
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6) Linda ate a hot sandwich. 
Jane ate a piece of pie. 
Mary ate a cold sandwich. 
Laura ate a hot lunch. 
a) Which are opposite? 
7) Kate was at the front of the line. 
Mary was at the water fountain. 
Jane was at the back of the line. 
Becky was in the middle of the line. 
a) Which are opposite? 
8) Scot likes to swim in cold water. 
Mark likes to drink cold soda. 
Luke likes to drink milk. 
Matt likes to swim in warm water. 
a) Which are opposite? 
9) Jane ran to the back of the house. 
Linda ran inside the house. 
Becky ran to the front of the house. 
Mary ran around the house. 
a) Which are opposite? 
10) John put the book on top of the table. 
Luke put the book on top of the sofa (couch). 
Mark put the book under the table. 
Scot put the book next to the sofa (couch). 
a) Which two are opposite? 
11) Henry is a tall boy. 
Tiger is a short dog. 
Mark is a short boy. 
Garfield is a little cat. 




DATA FROM QUESTIONNAIRE 
Key 
Subj = subject number 
Male= 1 Female= 2 
Subsection II = Y (yes) knew II opposite" N (no) 
did not know II opposite 11 
Subj Sex Grade I II III IV 
A B 
15 1 K 6 y 7 6 3 
16 2 K 4 N 5 4 0 
27 2 K 9 y 8 1 11 
26 2 K 12 y 11 11 10 
14 1 K 11 N 10 7 3 
42 1 K 9 N 9 0 4 
5 2 K 9 N 6 5 6 
29 1 K 2 N 4 4 6 
30 1 K 9 y 11 11 2 
35 1 K 4 N 8 2 3 
36 1 K 9 N 7 7 7 
123 2 K 7 N 8 8 6 
121 1 K 10 y 8 8 5 
120 1 K 11 y 11 11 10 
119 1 K 4 y 4 4 3 
118 2 K 7 y 8 8 5 
125 2 K 9 N 10 10 9 
124 1 K 2 N 4 2 3 
25 2 K 12 y 11 11 4 
1 1 1 10 N 10 0 6 
24 2 1 13 y 9 0 2 
45 2 1 11 N 9 9 2 
41 2 1 13 y 11 11 10 
40 2 1 9 y 11 11 5 
2 2 1 11 y 11 11 10 
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Subj Sex Grade I II III IV 
A B 
3 1 1 7 N 8 5 1 
4 2 1 11 y 11 11 10 
43 2 1 9 y 10 10 11 
117 2 1 10 N 9 3 3 
116 2 1 6 y 5 5 10 
115 2 1 9 N 9 3 3 
95 1 1 9 y 9 7 8 
78 2 1 7 y 10 10 9 
77 2 1 12 y 9 9 10 
76 2 1 13 y 11 11 8 
74 2 1 12 y 10 8 7 
75 1 1 10 y 8 8 9 
82 1 1 15 y 11 11 9 
83 1 1 11 y 10 10 8 
87 1 1 8 y 11 11 10 
56 2 1 12 N 5 10 5 
59 2 1 9 y 9 6 5 
60 1 1 10 N 9 5 6 
64 1 1 11 y 10 10 10 
58 2 1 11 y 10 10 11 
57 1 1 11 y 7 5 5 
7 1 2 9 y 11 11 11 
8 1 2 11 y 9 9 9 
6 2 2 9 y 11 10 11 
48 1 2 13 y 11 11 10 
46 1 2 14 y 11 11 11 
9 2 2 12 y 11 11 10 
44 1 2 13 y 11 11 10 
28 2 2 11 y 11 11 11 
37 2 2 12 y 11 11 10 
39 1 2 10 N 10 0 9 
114 2 2 13 N 9 9 9 
106 2 2 13 y 11 11 9 
105 1 2 12 y 11 11 11 
107 1 2 13 y 11 11 9 
108 2 2 13 y 11 11 10 
109 2 2 13 y 11 11 10 
110 2 2 14 y 10 10 11 
111 1 2 12 y 11 11 10 
112 2 2 10 y 10 10 11 
113 2 2 9 y 10 10 9 
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Subj Sex Grade I II III IV 
A B 
84 1 2 12 y 11 11 11 
47 2 3 13 y 10 10 11 
10 1 3 8 N 11 11 11 
11 1 3 13 N 10 10 8 
12 2 3 13 y 10 10 11 
13 2 3 13 y 10 10 8 
19 1 3 14 y 11 11 8 
21 2 3 12 y 11 11 11 
18 1 3 12 y 11 11 9 
17 1 3 13 y 10 10 11 
20 1 3 11 y 11 11 11 
22 2 3 14 y 11 11 5 
23 1 3 14 N 11 11 10 
65 1 3 12 y 10 10 10 
63 2 3 13 y 11 11 11 
61 1 3 15 y 11 11 10 
62 1 3 12 y 11 11 11 
93 2 3 13 y 11 11 11 
96 1 3 15 y 11 11 11 
81 1 3 13 y 10 9 11 
80 1 3 14 y 11 11 11 
79 2 3 13 y 11 11 10 
122 1 3 8 y 9 9 8 
91 2 3 12 y 10 10 10 
94 1 3 14 y 11 11 11 
34 2 4 6 y 11 11 11 
32 2 4 12 y 11 11 10 
31 1 4 13 y 11 11 10 
33 1 4 14 y 10 10 11 
92 2 4 11 y 11 11 11 
126 1 4 13 y 11 11 11 
127 1 4 12 y 10 10 11 
86 1 4 13 y 11 11 11 
104 1 4 13 y 11 11 10 
103 1 4 13 N 11 11 9 
102 2 4 13 y 10 10 9 
101 1 4 9 y 9 9 11 
100 1 4 11 y 10 10 10 
99 2 4 14 y 10 11 11 
97 1 4 13 y 11 11 10 
88 1 4 14 y 11 11 11 
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Subj Sex Grade I II III IV 
A B 
85 1 4 14 y 11 11 11 
51 2 5 14 y 11 11 11 
52 1 5 14 N 11 11 10 
53 2 5 14 y 11 11 11 
54 2 5 15 y 11 11 11 
55 2 5 13 y 11 11 11 
49 2 5 13 y 11 11 11 
50 2 5 15 y 10 10 11 
73 1 5 13 y 11 11 10 
71 2 5 13 y 10 11 11 
72 1 5 14 y 11 11 11 
70 1 5 13 y 11 11 11 
69 2 5 11 y 11 11 11 
68 2 5 14 y 10 10 10 
67 1 5 14 y 11 11 9 
66 1 5 12 y 11 11 10 
89 1 5 13 y 11 11 11 
90 1 5 11 y 11 11 11 
128 1 5 14 y 11 11 10 
129 1 5 14 y 11 11 11 
Subject# 38 -- a male Kindergartner didn't finish the interview 
Subject# 122 -- a male Kindergartner didn't speak any English 
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